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BREXIT and the Future of UK Environmental Law 
 
Abstract 
The UK’s decision to leave the EU will have major consequences for environmental law.  
EU law is integrated into the UK’s laws in many ways that will be difficult to disentangle 
and a continuity of laws provision seems desirable in order to avoid gaps in the law 
appearing.  The internal effect of devolution is that most environmental matters will in 
future be the responsibility the devolved administrations.  The UK’s freedom of action will 
continue to be restrained by obligations in international law, including those establishing a 
new relationship with the EU.  Environmental law in the UK has changed greatly during the 
four decades of its membership of the EU and most of the innovations introduced through 
the EU are likely to be retained, although there may be a wish to restore more discretion 
over the outcomes to be achieved as opposed to having strict obligations to satisfy targets 
and standards.  In structural terms the biggest changes are likely to be the loss of the stability 
provided by the slow processes of making and changing EU law and the loss of means to 
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In June 2016 the result of a referendum in the United Kingdom (UK) was in favour of 
leaving the European Union (EU).  The only certain consequence of that vote is uncertainty, 
with a change of Prime Minister, differing views on the pace and details of the withdrawal 
negotiations, ongoing debates on the nature on the UK’s future relationships with the EU 
and other states and discussion of various scenarios that might lead to the break-up of the 
UK itself1 (and indeed speculation on ways of reversing or revisiting the decision to 
withdraw).  At the time of writing, shortly after the referendum, it would be foolish indeed 
to predict what the position will be by the time this piece is being read.  Nevertheless, the 
changes brought about by ‘Brexit’2 will be profound, particularly in areas such as 
environmental law where the EU has done so much to shape the transformation of the law 
over the four decades since the UK joined the EU.3  This paper gives a brief overview of 
some of the challenges that lie ahead, considering the structural issue of how UK and EU 
                                                      
1 In particular, the fact that Scotland clearly voted to remain within the EU is seen as a possible trigger for a 
second referendum on Scottish independence, following the one in September 2014 which decided against 
separation from the UK, but with 45% of those voting favouring independence. 
2 The term ‘Brexit’ refers to Britain ‘exiting’ the EU. 
3 The United Kingdom joined the European Union on 1 January 1973; Treaty concerning the accession of the 
Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland to the European Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community[1972] OJ 
L73/5, art. 2 (following a referendum after the treaty was agreed, Norway decided not to join and has remained 
outside the EU). 
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laws are entwined, the international dimension and possible implications for the substance of 
environmental law. 
 
The process for a Member State to leave the EU is laid out in article 50 of the Treaty 
on European Union and calls for the EU to ‘negotiate and conclude an agreement with that 
State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its 
future relationship with the Union’.   Withdrawal takes effect in accordance with that 
agreement, or two years after the submission of the notification of intention to withdraw 
(unless an extension is unanimously agreed).  The timing of that formal notification, the tone 
of the negotiations and the possible future relationships are all uncertain at the time of 
writing.  What follows will therefore concentrate on some of the known consequences of 





At a simplistic level achieving Brexit may seem straightforward.  EU law has authority 
within the UK by virtue of the European Communities Act 1972 and once the UK 
Parliament repeals that Act, the authority of all EU law disappears.  Unfortunately it is not as 
simple as that.  It is in the very nature of the EU legal system that the provisions of EU law 
are not distinct from domestic law but embedded in it and after four decades of membership 
the EU inheritance is deeply integrated into UK law.   
 
There are some cases where EU law does stand alone, with the content of the law 
relying exclusively on Treaty provisions4 and directly applicable EU Regulations5, but even 
here there are usually some related measures in UK law to assist enforcement or authorise 
public bodies to support the relevant activity.  More commonly, and especially in the 
environmental field where Directives6 have been the leading mechanism used make the law, 
the requirements of EU law have been given full legal form and effect through UK 
legislation.  Thus the legal protection required for Special Areas of Conservation under the 
Habitats Directive7 is achieved in practice through legislation made by the relevant UK 
authorities.8  The position is complicated by two other features.  Firstly, the UK legislation 
                                                      
4 Under EU law certain provisions of the Treaties are regarded as having ‘direct effects in the legal relations 
between the Member States and their citizens’ so that Treaty provisions can be relied on directly as creating  
rights and obligations which will be recognised by national courts, without any need for further domestic 
measures to implement or specifically adopt them; Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der 
Belastingen (case 26/62). 
5 Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, an EU Regulation is ‘binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable in all Member States’ (art.288), which means that it has the same legal force as legislation 
made at the national authorities. 
6 In contrast to the position with Regulations, an EU Directive is ‘binding as to the result to be achieved … but 
shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form of methods’ (ibid.), requiring legislation at national 
level to implement the measure fully, giving it full legal effect in the national legal system, whether by 
amending existing laws or introducing new ones so that the requirements of the Directive are fully satisfied; 
enforcement proceedings can be taken against a State which has not fully implemented a Directive within the 
prescribed time period and some provisions of Directives can be given ‘direct effect’ where the State is in 
default, allowing individuals to claim against the State rights which they would have had if the State had not 
failed in its obligation to establish such rights in its national law (Van Duyn v Home Office (case 41/74)).  
7 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and 
flora  [1992] OJ L206/7, art.6. 
8 Conservation (Natural Habitats, etc.) Regulations 1994, SI 1994/2716, Part 4; Conservation (Natural Habitats, 
etc.) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 1995, SR 1995/380, Part 4; Conservation of Habitats and Species 
Regulations 2010/490, Part 6. 
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may not be self-contained but make express reference to EU law on key points, eg there is 
no definition of ‘waste’ in the key UK legislation on this topic, but rather a reference to the 
definition in EU law.9  Secondly, EU initiatives may prompt UK legislation which does 
more than simply what is necessary to implement the EU law, eg the Environmental 
Assessment (Scotland) Act 2005 which applies strategic environmental assessments to plans 
well beyond the categories specified in EU law,10 and the transformation of water law in 
Scotland11 which incorporated the requirements of the Water Framework Directive12 but did 
much more than that. 
 
What this means is that there is no easy way of identifying and isolating the EU 
elements in the law applying within the UK.  A simple measure saying that all EU laws no 
longer have legal force would not eliminate all of the EU legacy since measures wholly 
embedded in UK legislation would continue unaffected.  It would also leave large chunks of 
UK law with major holes which would in effect prevent them from operating and open up a 
legal vacuum in areas where there would be no valid legal rules at all.13  The options 
therefore seem to be twofold.  One is to review all of the laws, identify all of the provisions 
directly or indirectly linked to EU law, decide whether these should be removed, kept in 
amended form or continued in force, and then replace every provision that is desired with a 
properly made domestic one.  It seems wholly unrealistic that that could be achieved before 
‘Brexit Day’.  The alternative is to provide for the continuing effect of all the law in force on 
Brexit Day, including measures in EU legislation, whether free-standing or incorporated 
directly or by reference into domestic laws.  This is what happened in Ireland when it broke 
away from the United Kingdom.14  Some headline measures might be identified as 
disappearing on Brexit Day, but the rest would continue, avoiding legal vacuums emerging 
and giving time for reflection and work in identifying what parts of EU-inspired law the UK 
wants to keep and what it wants to change or lose. 
 
 Two more structural points deserve to be made.  The first is that where law has EU 
origins, either directly or indirectly, UK courts are currently bound, to interpret it in the light 
of the EU provisions and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.15  This 
has led to the courts producing interpretations which stretch the words of a provision in a 
direction and to an extent which would not be the case if a purely domestic approach had 
been taken.  In relation to EU-inspired measures surviving Brexit, unless the Brexit 
legislation takes an extreme approach and prohibits all reference to EU sources, it will still 
be possible to refer to the EU context but this would merely be one strand, no longer the 
decisive one, in the task of interpretation.  There is also the question of whether existing 
interpretations, reached by UK courts but based on EU material, could be re-visited to take 
                                                      
9 Eg Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/675, reg.2. 
10 Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of 
the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment [2001] OJ L 197/30. 
11 S. Hendry, Frameworks for Water Law Reform (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 15-18. 
12 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a 
framework for Community action in the field of water policy [2000] OJ L327/1. 
13 Eg the substance of the legal controls on the import and export of endangered species is wholly contained in 
EU Regulations (Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 of 9 December 1996 on the protection of species of wild 
fauna and flora by regulating trade therein [1997] OJ L61/1), with the UK legislation limited to providing some 
enforcement measures (Control of Trade in Endangered Species (Enforcement) Regulations 1997, SI 
1997/1372), so that the loss of the EU rules would leave the UK with no law to satisfy its obligations as a party 
to the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species. 
14 Government of Ireland Act 1920, s.61. 
15 European Communities Act 1972, s.3(1). 
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account of the withdrawal, focusing attention on the statutory provisions themselves and 
their narrower UK context without the answer being dictated by the wider EU background.  
For example, if the definition of ‘waste’ currently found in EU legislation were to be 
continued after Brexit, would it be possible to go back several steps and develop a distinctly 
British interpretation of it, based on the statutory words alone and British rules of 
interpretation, setting aside the attempts of the UK courts over the years to make sense of 
and apply the Delphic comments of the European Court?16  
 
 The second is to note that the European Communities Act 1972 confers on Ministers 
a very broad power to make laws,17 which has been very heavily used in a wide range of 
areas.18  In most cases there will be overlapping powers within the specific domestic 
statutory regimes.  Nevertheless, the existence of such broad law-making powers has meant 
that in areas where the major policy and legal initiative lies in the hands of the EU, there has 
been no need to ensure that the terms of the most likely alternative domestic parent Acts 
actually confer specific power to do everything that might be required.  In the absence of the 
catch-all provision under the 1972 Act, unfortunate lacunae might be found, inhibiting the 
government’s power to act in a range of circumstances.   
  
 
Devolution and International Obligations 
 
Two further major structural issues need to be mentioned before the substance of the law is 
considered, one inward looking one, devolution, and one considering the UK’s relations 
with the wider world.  The devolution settlements enacted in 199819 created legislative and 
executive bodies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.  The precise extent of their 
powers varies, but generally extends to most environmental matters and an indirect but 
significant role of EU law has been to dampen the consequences of this diffusion of power.  
There were differences between each country even before the current devolution structures 
were introduced, but these have become more pronounced since.  Yet the facts that EU law 
accounts for so much of the law on environmental matters and that all jurisdictions are 
bound to operate within the framework set by EU law have meant that the capacity for each 
country to head off in its own direction has been limited.  This limitation is not just a feature 
of EU membership but is built into the devolution settlements, which prohibit the devolved 
administrations from acting in a way incompatible with EU law.20  For example, no country 
can decide to set its own water quality standards or to abolish controls on pesticides or to 
introduce far-reaching restrictions on diesel engines without falling foul of EU law and thus 
not only risking infringement proceedings from Europe but also, in the case of the devolved 
authorities, exceeding their legal powers.  There is room for national differences to emerge, 
but within limits. 
 
                                                      
16 See the comments of Carnwath LJ in R (OSS Group Ltd) v Environment Agency [2007] EWCA Civ 611, 
[2007] 3 CMLR 30, [2008] Env LR 8, [69]. 
17 Legislation can be made ‘for the purpose of implementing any EU obligation …, or enabling any such 
obligation to be implemented, or of enabling any rights enjoyed … by virtue of the Treaties to be exercised’ or 
‘for the purpose of dealing with matters arising out of or related to any such obligation or rights’; European 
Communities Act 1972, s.2(2). 
18 It also allows legislation to be made for the whole UK, overriding (with agreement in practice) the division of 
responsibility embodied in the devolution settlements, eg Scotland Act 1998, s.57.  
19 Scotland Act 1998, Government of Wales Act 1998 and Northern Ireland Act 1998, all subsequently subject 
to considerable amendment, extending devolved powers. 
20 Eg Scotland Act 1998, s.29(2)(d). 
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With Brexit, control over environmental law will return to the UK but on most 
matters not just to London but to the devolved administrations.  Each of these could develop 
radically different environmental laws, although there must be doubts over the capacity of 
all the administrations in a continuing age of austerity to take over responsibility for all the 
work currently undertaken through the EU to develop and maintain the law across all the 
sectors where EU law operates.  Providing the room for difference is, of course, one of the 
purposes of devolution in the first place, but there are consequences if the result is a 
fragmentation of the law.  The need to keep within the EU framework has imposed limits on 
divergence so far, but without this constraint fragmentation may be seen as a danger and 
there may be a call for new mechanisms to assist each country in addressing the levels of co-
ordination or differentiation appropriate for particular issues.  
 
 In leaving the EU the UK will lose many restrictions on its freedom to make its own 
environmental law, but it will not be free from all constraints.  The UK will continue to be 
bound by many international treaties.21  Obligations in relation to air pollution, nature 
conservation, chemical safety and many other areas will continue,22 as will the obligations to 
provide access to information, public participation and access to justice under the Aarhus 
Convention.  The big difference, of course, is that whereas EU law is very detailed, the EU 
structures provide strong (if slow) measures to enforce compliance by states, and domestic 
courts ensure that individuals can enjoy the rights conferred by EU law, the same does not 
apply for international law. 
 
New obligations are also inevitable.  At present we have no idea what shape it will 
take, but the withdrawal agreement will create a new legal relationship with the EU, 
including more or less access to the Single Market and with that more or less freedom to set 
standards on environmental and other grounds.  The close links within the European 
Economic Area require the application of most EU standards23 but it is worth noting that 
even the looser trade agreements between the EU and other states, such as the Ukraine or 
Canada, include provisions seeking high levels of environmental standards, the application 
of the precautionary principle and a commitment not to relax environmental laws in order to 





The substantive impact on environmental law of the UK’s membership of the EU, and of its 
withdrawal, are difficult to assess, although clearly very significant.25  Looking backwards, 
                                                      
21 One complication is that for treaties where the UK is currently bound because of the signature by the EU in 
areas of its exclusive competence the UK will have to become a party in its own right (subject to any 
negotiations with the EU and the other parties).   
22 At present it is often overlooked that what are seen primarily as EU measures may in fact be required under 
wider international agreements. 
23 The Common Agriculture and Fisheries Policies do not apply to European Economic Area members, but 
those were hardly major issues in the referendum debate. 
24 Eg Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, [2014] OJ L 161/3, arts 290, 292, 296. 
25 For detailed examinations of this see House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, EU and UK 
Environmental Policy, Third Report of Session 2015–16 (2015-16 HC 537); Burns et al, The EU Referendum 
and the UK Environment: An Expert Review available at http://environmenteuref.blogspot.co.uk/p/the-
report.html; Institute for European Environmental Policy, The potential policy and environmental consequences 




there can be no doubt that the UK’s environmental law today is very different from what it 
was when the EU was joined in 1973.  Innovations introduced into the law through the EU 
include environmental assessment, access to environmental information and bathing water 
standards, whilst the requirements of the Water and Waste Framework Directives have 
dominated the law in those areas and the Birds and Habitats Directives have established 
clear obligations not just to take into account but actually to achieve the conservation of 
biodiversity.  There is no doubt that the UK’s law would have changed markedly since the 
1970s without involvement with the EU, but also that: “The UK’s membership of the EU 
has ensured environmental action was taken on a faster timetable and more thoroughly than 
would otherwise have been the case.”26  As one example, although some investment in this 
area would have been likely, it is hard to envisage that the UK would have spent as much 
money as quickly on the very costly up-grading of sewage treatment systems across the 
country were it not for the obligation to meet the Urban Waste Water and Bathing Water 
Directives. 
 
The transformation of the law is not just about the introduction of measures such as 
those mentioned above which had no place in the UK’s law in the early 1970s.  There are 
very significant aspects of the nature of the law itself.  The first of these is the stability of 
EU law.  It may take a frustratingly long time for laws to emerge from the EU, and then to 
be implemented by all the Member States, but once made they stick around.  They are not as 
vulnerable to the short-term pressures of national politics as domestic legislation.  The 
difficulty of revision can mean that desirable improvements are not made, but the fact that 
the laws are not subject to constant chopping and changing has its advantages.  In particular 
the stability of EU law is well-suited to tackling major environmental problems such as 
water quality and climate change where long-term programmes and investments are needed 
to achieve substantial results.  The setting of targets for several years in the future and the 
stability of environmental standards enables industry and investors to plan ahead and allows 
for the integration of different policy areas to be developed.  The greater scope for rapid 
change that would follow Brexit27 brings both the advantages and disadvantages of 
flexibility, with the potential to respond more quickly to changing circumstances but also a 
lack of certainty as to the future.28  
 
A second feature of EU environmental law is the use of strict standards and the 
imposition of targets.  The older domestic law in the UK tended to favour broad statements 
of purposes or functions supported by largely discretionary powers, leaving it to the 
executive body concerned (the Minister, local authority or agency) to determine for itself the 
outcome that should result once all relevant considerations have been duly taken into 
account.  Fixed quality standards are now an accepted part of UK environmental law, but, 
especially in view of the de-regulatory rhetoric of some in the ‘Leave campaign’,29 it is 
possible that some discretion might return, allowing some room for manoeuvre when 
meeting the legal standards or targets seems particularly difficult, expensive or 
disproportionate or conflicts with other policy goals.  Thus in an area such as nature 
conservation, there may not be a wholesale dismantling of the EU laws which give 
protection to designated species and habitats, but there might be a desire to relax the near 
                                                      
26 Environmental Audit Committee (n 25) 3, 10. 
27 With the added factor that each of the devolved administrations will be responsible for the law in their own 
country, subject to their own pressures on the legislative timetable, even where there no differences in 
substance. 
28 Environmental Audit Committee (n 25) 15-16. 
29 Those arguing in the pre-referendum campaigning for the UK to leave the EU. 
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absolute nature of the obligations set, so that conservation arguments can be overridden and 
development which has an adverse effect on a Special Area of Conservation or on a 
protected species can be permitted in circumstances well beyond the tightly confined 
derogations built in to the EU laws.30  
 
 A third point, and one that may be the most important, is that EU law provides a 
means of calling the government to account.  Once environmental obligations have been 
accepted, the Member States must abide by them.  Even when they become costly to 
implement, difficult to achieve or obstruct what have emerged as more important current 
priorities, the law and the environmental goals it embodies must be followed.  Where it is 
argued that a State is falling short of its obligations under EU law there are means (slow and 
imperfect though they are) for using the Court of Justice to seek compliance.31  Moreover, 
the UK courts themselves are in a positon to insist that the authorities keep to the long-term 
promises embodied in EU law, such as in the recent litigation over air quality targets.32   
 
 In the absence of the EU dimension, however, there are much more challenging 
questions over how the government can be held to account over its environmental 
commitments.  As noted above, there may be similar commitments undertaken as a matter of 
international law, but these tend not to be so ‘hard-edged’ in their definition and therefore 
would be harder to enforce in particular instances, even if there were an effective 
mechanism for securing compliance at the international level.  Some such mechanisms do 
exist, such as the Compliance Committee under the Aarhus Convention, but its decisions 
lack the full force of law enjoyed by decisions of the Court of Justice so that even if an 
authority’s actions were held to have breached the Convention that does not mean that it was 
acting unlawfully as a matter of domestic law.  There are also fewer opportunities for 
individuals and groups to take the initiative in the international sphere, as opposed to the 
potential for complaints to the Commission or litigation where EU law confers rights. 
 
 The accountability provided through EU law has meant that the courts have not had 
to explore the extent to which general environmental duties and goals in UK laws can be 
used as fetters on governmental discretion when it is being exercised to the detriment of the 
stated objectives.  At what point would it be possible to say that allowing development 
affecting sites of value to nature was a contravention of the duty ‘in exercising any 
functions, to further the conservation of biodiversity so far as is consistent with the proper 
exercise of those functions’33 or, where water is affected, that there is a breach of the duty to 
‘exercise any power … to further the conservation and enhancement of natural beauty and 
the conservation of flora, fauna and geological or physiographical features of special 
interest’?34  The debates and uncertainty about the status and enforceability of the much 
more specific and legally binding greenhouse gas reduction targets in the Climate Change 
                                                      
30 The steady stream of cases coming before the Court of Justice of the EU shows how often Member States are 
giving priority to other concerns over the conservation of biodiversity, despite the Court’s constant reminders of 
the obligations they have accepted; eg Sweetman v An Bord Pleaná (C-258/11), Commission v Greece (C-
600/12), Commission v Bulgaria (C-141/14). 
31 M. Hedemann-Robinson, Enforcement of European Union Environmental Law: Legal Issues and Challenges 
(2nd ed, 2015, Routledge). 
32 R (ClientEarth) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2015] UKSC 28; this is an 
obvious area where even if air quality targets are maintained following Brexit, greater leeway might be 
introduced over how quickly and how far they have to be satisfied. 
33 Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004, s.1. 
34 Water Industry Act 1991, s.3(2). 
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Once it has withdrawn from the EU, the UK will be able to make a choice over what it does 
with the law inherited from the EU.  That will not be a completely free choice, given the 
constraints imposed by commitments already existing in international law and those entered 
into in settling the new relationship between the UK and its neighbours (including the extent 
of access to the Single Market).  Most of the major elements in the UK’s environmental law 
have EU origins, from environmental impact assessment through the definition of waste to 
air and water quality standards.  The UK - or rather in view of the devolution settlements, 
the devolved administrations - will have the choice whether or not to continue such 
measures, with or without adjustment.  It would seem pointless to dismantle the framework 
of environmental law simply because of its EU origins and there is no reason to expect a 
sudden and fundamental change in most areas.  Nevertheless, the deregulatory tone of much 
of the current UK government’s rhetoric (and even more of the Leave campaign) might 
suggest that the new flexibility is likely to be used to reduce the extent to which 
environmental protection is pursued when it conflicts with other policy goals; air quality 
targets inherited from the EU are not likely to be seen as an insuperable obstacle to airport 
expansion around London.  The new freedom of action would equally allow for a radical 
strengthening of environmental protection on some issues (possibly animal welfare where 
the UK has been at the forefront of pushing for higher standards), but that seems less likely. 
 
For environmental law overall, the most significant changes are likely to be not so 
much in the details of any legislation, but the new vulnerability of environmental rules to 
short-term political pressures and the removal of the means by which the government can be 
called to account.  Whatever its flaws, the EU has provided a stable framework of 
environmental law and the means to ensure that governments and others live up to their 
obligations.  The post-Brexit world will be more volatile.  At the time of writing there is no 
clarity about when the formal negotiations for withdrawal will begin, far less be completed, 
nor over the tone and content of those negotiations.  In particular we do not know the future 
relationship with the EU and the Single Market, and what that will mean for the need to 
continue to comply with EU standards on environmental and many other matters. Nor do we 
know how far there will be a willingness to allow the existing laws based on EU measures to 
survive unchanged, or conversely a desire (and capacity) to embark on major revisions.  





Prof. Colin T. Reid 
Professor of Environmental Law 




                                                      
35 Colin T Reid, ‘A New Form of Duty? The Significance of ‘Outcome’ Duties in the Climate Change and Child 
Poverty Acts’ [2012] Public Law 749. 
